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Abstract
We establish the importance of team-specific capital in the typi-
cal inventor’s career. Using administrative tax and patent data for the
population of US patent inventors from 1996 to 2012, we find that an in-
ventor’s premature death causes a large and long-lasting decline in their
co-inventor’s earnings and citation-weighted patents (-4% and -15% af-
ter 8 years, respectively). After ruling out firm disruption, network
effects and top-down spillovers as main channels, we show that the ef-
fect is driven by close-knit teams and that team-specific capital largely
results from an “experience” component increasing collaboration value
over time.
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Teamwork has become an essential feature of modern economies and knowl-
edge production (Wuchty, Jones and Uzzi (2007); Jones (2010); Crescenzi,
Nathan and Rodr´ıguez-Pose (2016); Jaffe and Jones (2015); Seaborn.T (1979)).
We investigate empirically the importance of team-specific capital for the com-
pensation and patent production of inventors, using administrative tax and
patent data for the population of US patent inventors from 1996 to 2012.
Conceptually, while general human capital augments productivity at all firms
(Becker (1975)), and while firm-specific capital augments productivity with
any existing or future collaborators within the firm(Topel (1991)), the idea of
team-specific capital is that an inventor may be more productive with their
existing co-inventors. Team-specific capital encompasses skills, experiences
and knowledge that are useful only in the context of a specific collaborative
relationship: high team-specific capital means that the collaborative dynamics
in the team are unique and difficult to rebuild with other collaborators, which
improves each inventor’s ability to produce valuable innovations with these
specific co-inventors. If the collaboration between two patent inventors were
to exogenously end, would this have a significant and long-lasting impact on
the career, compensation, and patents of these inventors? Or are co-inventors
easily substituted for, beyond short-term disruption of ongoing work? In other
words, is team-specific capital an important ingredient of the typical inventor’s
lifecycle earnings and patents, much like firm-specific capital is crucial for the
typical worker? This paper establishes the existence, nature and economic
relevance of patent inventors’ team-specific capital.
We provide causal estimates of what the typical inventor would lose, in
terms of labor earnings, total earnings and patent production, if a collaboration
with one of their co-inventors were to end exogenously. Using a detailed merged
dataset of United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) patents data
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and Treasury administrative tax data, we use the premature deaths of 4,714
inventors, defined as deaths that occur before or at the age of 60, as a source of
exogenous variation in collaborative networks. The causal effect is identified
in a difference-in-differences research design, using a control group of patent
inventors whose co-inventors did not pass away but who are otherwise sim-
ilar to the inventors who experienced the premature death of a co-inventor.
We find that ending a collaboration causes a large and long-lasting decline in
an inventor’s labor earnings (- 3.8% after 8 years), total earnings (- 4% after
8 years) and citation-weighted patents (- 15% after 8 years). This evidence
implies that the continuation of collaborative relationships has substantial spe-
cific value for the typical inventor, approximately equal to half of the returns
to one year of schooling (Mincer et al. (1974)). It rejects the alternative hy-
pothesis that continued collaborations are not a key ingredient in an inventor’s
earnings function and patent production function beyond short-term disrup-
tion of ongoing work.
To establish team-specific capital as the primary explanatory mechanism,
we show that the decline in earnings and citation-weighted patents following
the premature death of a co-inventor is driven by the fact that the inventor
lost a partner with whom they were collaborating extensively, which made
additional co-inventions impossible. We do so in four steps. First, we rule
out alternative explanatory mechanisms that are not specific to the team. In
particular, we establish that the effect does not stem from the disruption of
the firm or from network effects by estimating the causal effect of an inven-
tor’s death on their coworkers and on inventors that are two nodes away from
the deceased in the co-inventor network.1 Second, we show that although
1In our data, firms are proxied for by tax Employer Identification Numbers (see Section II
for a complete discussion). In addition to ruling out important alternative mechanisms that
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top-down spillovers from unusually high-achieving deceased inventors are im-
portant (consistent with Azoulay, Graff Zivin and Wang (2010); Oettl (2012)),
they are not driving the average effect we document. Third, we demonstrate
that the intensity of the collaboration between an inventor and their deceased
co-inventor prior to death is an important predictor of the magnitude of the
effect. Fourth, we document that the effect of co-inventor death on an in-
ventor’s patents is much smaller when patents that were co-invented with the
deceased are not taken into account in the difference-in-differences analysis:
although the survivor’s own patents suffer as well, the effect primarily applies
to co-invention activities with the deceased.2
Finally, we investigate how team-specific capital is formed and how it in-
creases inventors’ earnings and patents. We use heterogeneity in the treatment
effect to test the implications of various possible models of team-specific cap-
ital. We reject a broad class of search-and-matching models in which team-
specific capital is conceptualized as resulting from a “match” component which
is constant over time, for instance when two inventors are a particularly good
fit for each other. In contrast, we find support for the view that team-specific
capital accumulates during a collaboration and results from an “experience”
component which increases the value of the collaboration over time, for exam-
ple when two inventors learn how to best collaborate with each other over the
course of several joint projects.
Our work relates to several strands of literature. The use of premature
could explain our finding, the analysis of firm and network effects yields new insights about
substitution and complementarity patterns between inventors in the innovation production
function (see Section IV for a complete discussion).
2We also show that team-specific capital matters in all technology categories, at various
levels of the distribution of patent quality, and spans the boundaries of commuting zones
and firms. In Section IV, we discuss whether other mechanisms could be consistent with
the evidence.
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deaths as a source of identification is becoming increasingly common (Jones
and Olken (2005); Bennedsen et al. (2007); Azoulay, Graff Zivin and Wang
(2010); Nguyen and Nielsen (2010); Oettl (2012); Becker and Hvide (2016);
Fadlon and Nielsen (2015); Isen (2013)) and several papers have investigated
peer effects in specific areas of science: Agrawal, Kapur and McHale (2008);
Borjas and Doran (2012, 2015); Oettl (2012); Waldinger (2010, 2011). Our
paper is the first to study collaboration effects by looking at both earnings
and innovation outcomes. Our results are consistent with the findings that
direct collaborators matter, as in Azoulay, Graff Zivin and Wang (2010) and
Borjas and Doran (2015) , but also that there are no wider firm-specific or
university-specific spillovers, as in Waldinger (2011). We estimate the dif-
ferential spillover effect of an inventor on various peer groups (co-inventors,
coworkers, and second-degree connections in the co-inventor networks) using
the same research design, which allows us to establish the unique importance of
co-inventors in an inventor’s career. Other related strands of literature study
the role of teams in innovation (e.g. De Dreu (2006); Jones (2009); Agrawal,
Kapur and McHale (2008); Alexander and Van Knippenberg (2014)), examine
the notion of team-specific or network-specific human capital from a theoreti-
cal perspective (e.g. Mailath and Postlewaite (1990); Chillemi and Gui (1997))
, investigate the effect of co-mobility of colleagues (Hayes, Oyer and Schaefer
(2005); Groysberg and Lee (2009); Campbell, Saxton and Banerjee (2014)) and
develop theories of knowledge spillovers across inventors (e.g. Stein (2008); Lu-
cas and Moll (2014)). Finally, this paper is part of a nascent literature using
administrative data to describe the careers of patent inventors (Toivanen and
Va¨a¨na¨nen (2012); Bell et al. (2016); Dorner et al. (2014); Depalo, Addario and
Lucia (2014); Aghion and Howitt (1992)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present
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the dataset and novel descriptive statistics on the composition of teams. In
Section III, we describe the research design and present the estimates of the
causal effect of the premature death of a co-inventor on an inventor’s compen-
sation and patents. In Section IV, we establish that team-specific capital is
a central explanatory channel, ruling out alternative mechanisms that do not
operate within teams. In Section V, we present a series of results delivering
insights about the workings of team specific capital. Section VI concludes.
Several robustness checks, heterogeneity results and empirical estimation de-
tails are deferred to the Online Appendix.3
I. Data and Descriptive Statistics
A. Data Construction
We use a merged dataset of United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) patents data and Treasury administrative tax files as inBell et al.
(2016). The patent data are extracted from the weekly text and XML files
of patent grant recordations hosted by Google. The raw files contain the full
text of about 5 million patents granted from 1976 to today, extracted from the
USPTO internal databases in weekly increments.
Administrative data on the universe of U.S. taxpayers is sourced from Trea-
sury administrative tax files. We extract information on inventors’ city and
state of residence, wages, employer ID, adjusted gross income, as well as cur-
rent citizenship status and gender from Social Security records. Most data are
3Appendix A reports additional summary statistics and tests for balance between treated
and control groups. Appendix B presents robustness checks on the causal effect of co-
inventor death. Appendix C conducts additional tests for heterogeneity in the effect of
co-inventor death. Appendix D provides additional results on the nature of team-specific
capital. Appendix E provides more details on our econometric framework. Appendix F
describes the construction of the dataset and reports additional summary statistics on the
composition of inventor teams.
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available starting in 1996, however wages and employer ID are available only
starting in 1999, which marks the beginning of W-2 reporting. Inventors from
the USPTO patent data are matched to individual taxpayers using informa-
tion on name, city and state of residence (Appendix A describes the iterative
stages of the match algorithm). The match rate is over 85% and the matched
and unmatched inventors appear similar on observables, as documented inBell
et al. (2016). Any inventor with a non-U.S. address in the USPTO patent data
is excluded from the matching process and dropped from the sample. The re-
sulting dataset is a panel of the universe of U.S.-based inventors, tracking over
750,000 inventors from 1996 to 2012, which we refer to as the “full sample” of
inventors for the remainder of the paper.
The employer ID is based on the Employer Identification Number (EIN)
reported on W-2 forms. In some cases, it could be that business entities
with different EINs are the subsidiary of the same parent company, therefore
business entities with distinct EINs are not necessarily distinct firms.
B. Identifying Deceased Inventors, Survivor Co-inventors,
Second-Degree Connections and Coworkers
We construct various groups of inventors to carry out the premature death
research design. We start by identifying 4,924 inventors who passed away
before or at the age of 60 and were granted a patent by USPTO before their
death.4 Information on the year of death and age at death is known from
Social Security records. The cause of death is not known. In order to reduce
the likelihood that death results from a lingering health condition, we consider
4As described below, ultimately we analyze only 4,714 premature deaths due to the lack
of appropriate matches for the remaining prematurely deceased inventors. We consider
prematurely deceased inventors who are weakly below 60, i.e. we keep inventors who are 60
in the year of death.
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inventors passing away before or at the age of 60 and, in robustness checks,
we repeat the analysis by excluding deceased inventors who ever claimed tax
deductions for high medical expenses.
We construct a group of “placebo deceased inventors” who appear similar
to the prematurely deceased inventors but did not pass away. Specifically, we
use a one-to-one exact matching procedure on year of birth, cumulative number
of patent applications at the time of (real or placebo) death, and year of (real
or placebo) death in order to identify placebo deceased inventors among the
full population of inventors.5 4,714 deceased inventors find an exact match
using this procedure.6 Thus, we obtain a control group of placebo deceased
inventors who have exactly the same age, the same number of cumulative
patent applications and exactly the same year of (placebo) death as their
associated (real) deceased inventor.
Next, we build the co-inventor networks of the real and placebo deceased
inventors. Any inventor who ever appeared on a patent with a real or placebo
deceased inventor before the time of (real or placebo) death is included in
these networks. In the rest of the paper, we refer to these inventors as real and
placebo “survivor inventors.” We exclude survivor inventors who are linked
5The match is conducted year by year. For instance, for inventors who passed away in
2000, we look for exact matches in the full sample of inventors. An exact match is found
if the control inventor was born in the same year and had the same number of cumulative
patent applications as the deceased in 2000. The inventors from the full sample that match
are then taken out of the sample of potential matches, and the procedure is repeated for the
following year, until the end of the sample. This matching procedure without replacement
thus determines a counterfactual timing of death for the placebo deceased inventors. When
there is more than one exact match, the ties are broken at random.
6The 5% unmatched deceased inventors do not significantly differ on observable char-
acteristics from those who find a match, except that they tend to have more cumulative
applications at the time of death. In robustness checks presented in Appendix E, we repeat
the analysis with a propensity-score reweighting approach which uses data on all deceased
inventors and obtain similar results.
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to more than one real or placebo deceased inventor.7 We thus obtain 14,150
real survivor inventors and 13,350 placebo survivor inventors. These inventors
constitute the main sample used for the analysis carried out in the rest of the
paper. Note that we perform the matching procedure on the real and placebo
deceased inventors rather than on the survivor inventors - the benefits of this
approach are discussed in Section III.
We construct two other groups of inventors, which will be used to differenti-
ate between mechanisms. First, we build the network of inventors who are two
nodes away from the real and placebo deceased inventors in the co-inventor
network. These inventors are direct co-inventors of the deceased’s direct co-
inventors, but they never co-invented a patent with any of the (real or placebo)
deceased inventors. To increase the likelihood that these inventors were never
directly in contact with the deceased, we impose two additional restrictions:
of the inventors who are two nodes away from the deceased in the co-inventor
network, we keep only those who never worked for the same employer and
never lived in the same commuting zone as the deceased inventor. We refer
to these inventors as real and placebo “second-degree connections” for the re-
mainder of the paper. As before, we exclude inventors in this group who are
linked to more than one real or placebo deceased inventors. This procedure
yields 11,264 real second-degree connections and 12,047 placebo second-degree
connections. Second, we construct the group of “coworkers” of the deceased
by identifying all inventors who worked for the same employer as the deceased
in the year before death, as indicated on W-2 forms. We exclude coworkers
that ever co-invented with a prematurely deceased inventor or who experi-
enced multiple premature death events. Focusing on coworkers in firms with
less then 2,000 employees, the final sample consists of 13,828 real coworkers
7We lose only 36 survivor inventors by imposing this restriction.
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and 14,364 placebo coworkers.8
C. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics on Inventors
In the analysis carried out in the rest of the paper, we study various out-
come variables at the individual level from 1999 until 2012. First, we consider
inventors’ labor earnings, which refer to annual W-2 earnings. When an in-
ventor does not receive a W-2 form after 1999, we impute their labor earnings
in that year to be zero. Second, we construct a measure of an inventors’ total
earnings, defined as an inventors’ adjusted gross income (earnings reported on
IRS tax form 1040 ) minus the W-2 earnings of the inventor’s spouse. Adjusted
gross income is a tax concept offering a comprehensive measure of a household’s
income, including royalties, self-employment income and any other source of
income reported on 1040 tax forms.9 We define non-labor earnings as the
difference between total earnings and labor earnings. All earnings variables
are winsorized at the 1% level.10 Third, we use adjusted forward citations,
which are defined for year t as the total number of forward citations received
on all patents the individual applied for in year t, divided by the number of
inventors who appear on each patent. Forward citations include all citations
8We focus on smaller firms to increase the chances that we find a negative effect of an
inventor’s death on their coworkers, since we are interested in testing whether the effect we
document for co-inventors is driven by the disruption of the firm. In Appendix C, we carry
out the analysis on the full sample of coworkers, composed of 173,128 real survivor coworkers
and 143,646 placebo survivor coworkers, and we find similar results. The difference in the
size of the groups of real and placebo coworkers in the full sample is driven by a thin tail of
deceased inventors working in firms employing thousands of other inventors, as documented
in Appendix Table A5.
9A limitation of our measure of total earnings for inventors filing jointly is that we
can only subtract the inventor’s spouse’s W-2 earnings from the household’s adjusted gross
income, not the spouse’s other sources of income, which are unobserved. But the exact same
procedure is applied to all inventors in the various groups we consider. Another limitation
is that adjusted gross income does not include tax-exempt interest income.
10We have checked that the results are robust to winsorizing at the 5% level and that we
obtain similar results when we do not winsorize (see Appendix Table B14).
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of the patent made as of December 2012 and are a measure of the “quality”
of innovative output. We divide forward citations by the total number of in-
ventors on the patent to reflect the fact that a single inventor’s contribution
is smaller in larger teams.11 Fourth, we use the number of patents granted by
the USPTO as of December 2012, as well as the number of patents in the top
5% of the citation distribution.12 Lastly, we create indicator variables that
turn to one when labor earnings are greater than 0 or above thresholds for
the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the labor earnings distribution.13 We
proceed similarly for total earnings. These indicators are used as outcome
variables to characterize the effect of an inventor’s premature death on their
co-inventors’ compensation at different quantiles of the income distribution.
Since labor earnings are only available from 1999 onwards, for consistency we
do not use data prior to 1999 for any of the variables in the analysis, but the
results are qualitatively similar when pre-1999 data are included for adjusted
gross income, patent applications and citations.
Panel A of Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables of interest
in the main samples used in the analysis. Statistics on total earnings and
wages are computed based on the entire panel for the full sample of inventors,
11This is common practice. We check the robustness of our results with other measures
of citations, which do not adjust for team size, take into account citations only over a fixed
rolling window of a couple years around application or grant (in order to address truncation
issues), and distinguish between examiner-added and applicant-added citations. Section III
discusses these various robustness checks.
12We define the count of patents in the top 5% of citations as the number of patents
the survivor inventor applied for in a given year that were in the top 5% of the citation
distribution, where the distribution is computed based on all patents that were cited, applied
for in the same year and in the same technology class (we aggregate USPC classes into six
main technology classes, as is common in the literature). Throughout the paper, we consider
only patents that were granted as of December 2012 and we use the year of filing of the
patent application as the year of production of the invention.
13These quantiles are computed before the time of death in the population of real and
placebo survivor inventors.
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and based on years before the death event for the deceased and the survivor
inventors. Age, cumulative applications and cumulative citations are com-
puted in the year of death for the deceased and the survivors, and across all
years for the full sample. Panel B of Table 1 presents similar statistics for the
second-degree connections and coworkers. Appendix Tables A1 and A2 report
more detailed summary statistics, showing the full distribution of the various
outcomes for each group of inventors.
The real deceased inventors are on average seven years older than inventors
in the full sample. By construction, the mean and distribution of age at death
for the placebo deceased inventors exactly match that of the real deceased
inventors. Likewise, the mean and distribution of the number of applications is
the same for real and placebo deceased inventors. The means and distributions
of labor earnings, total earnings and forward citations are also very similar in
these two groups, although our matching algorithm did not match on these
variables. The real and placebo survivor inventors are also older than inventors
in the full sample and they have much higher labor earnings and total earnings
and many more patent applications and citations. The age difference is due
to the fact that there is assortative matching by age in inventor teams, as
discussed in Section II.D, and the deceased are older than inventors in the full
sample. The difference in compensation and patents is due to a selection effect:
inventors who have co-invented many patents are more likely to experience the
(real or placebo) death of one of their co-inventors. Therefore, it would not be
appropriate to use the full population of inventors as a control group for the
real survivor inventors, as their lifecycle earnings are likely to be on different
trajectories. In contrast, the means and distributions of labor earnings, total
earnings, age and patent applications and citations are very similar in the gr-
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Table 1—Summary Statistics on Inventors
Panel A. For Main Analysis
Variable Sample Mean SD
Full Sample 144,096 316,636
Real Deceased 139,857 308,000
Total Earnings Placebo Deceased 139,102 320,970
Real Survivors 177,020 355,347
Placebo Survivors 177,247 360,780
Full Sample 117,559 257,466
Real Deceased 121,691 258,289
Labor Earnings Placebo Deceased 124,149 248,546
Real Survivors 152,602 295,832
Placebo Survivors 155,098 290,201
Full Sample 2.31 2.51
Real Deceased 2.50 2.43
Cumulative Applications Placebo Deceased 2.50 2.43
Real Survivors 12.42 28.31
Placebo Survivors 11.92 29.52
Full Sample 6.64 12.2
Real Deceased 8.74 13.09
Cumulative Citations Placebo Deceased 8.51 13.20
Real Survivors 42.00 171.03
Placebo Survivors 40.20 164.20
Full Sample 43.29 9.65
Real Deceased 50.85 7.44
Age Placebo Deceased 50.85 7.44
Real Survivors 47.53 10.89
Placebo Survivors 47.289 11.16
Full Sample 756,118
Real Deceased 4,714




Table 1—Summary Statistics on Inventors(continued)
Panel B. For Additional Analysis
Variable Sample Mean SD
Real 2nd-degree Connections 175,247 358,347
Total Earnings Placebo 2nd-degree Connections 174,900 350,102
Real Coworkers 149,861 312,721
Placebo Coworkers 154,627 316,266
Real 2nd-degree Connections 144,449 291,697
Labor Earnings Placebo 2nd-degree Connections 146,674 297,697
Real Coworkers 114,559 258,233
Placebo Coworkers 117,691 256,908
Real 2nd-degree Connections 10.42 42.78
Cumulative Applications Placebo 2nd-degree Connections 9.92 25.21
Real Coworkers 2.40 2.58
Placebo Coworkers 2.45 2.52
Real 2nd-degree Connections 37.76 170.11
Cumulative Citations Placebo 2nd-degree Connections 39.40 173.23
Real Coworkers 5.74 11.62
Placebo Coworkers 6.05 12.19
Real 2nd-degree Connections 47.72 19.08
Placebo 2nd-degree Connections 47.93 19.96
Real Coworkers 44.28 12.94
Placebo Coworkers 44.49 16.13
Real 2nd-degree Connections 11,264
# Inventors Placebo 2nd-degree Connections 12,047
Real Coworkers 13,828
Placebo Coworkers 14,364
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the various groups of inventors defined in Section II.B. The
statistics for the full sample are computed using data from 1999 to 2012. For the deceased and survivor
inventors, as well as the second-degree connections and co-workers, the statistics are computed using data
before the year of death. Dollar amounts are reported in 2012 dollars. Appendix Tables A1 and A2 report
more detailed summary statistics, showing the full distribution of outcomes. For a detailed description of
the data sources and sample construction, see Sections II.A and II.B.
-oup of placebo survivors and real survivors. Importantly, our matching algo-
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rithm did not impose that any of the characteristics of the placebo survivor
inventors should be aligned with those of the real survivor inventors, since we
matched on characteristics of the real and placebo deceased only. The La-
bor earnings are slightly lower for the real survivors compared to the placebo
survivors, but we will check in Section III that this difference is constant dur-
ing years prior to co-inventor death, consistent with the assumptions of the
difference-in-differences research design. Appendix Tables A3 and A4 show
that the real and placebo survivors are also similar in terms of the year of
co-inventor death, their technology class specialization, the size of their co-
inventor networks and the size of their firms.
Finally, Panel B of Table 1 shows that the populations of real and placebo
second-degree connections are similar to the survivor inventors, while the out-
comes for real and placebo coworkers are close to those of the full sample.
D. Descriptive Statistics on Patent Inventor Teams
Teams of inventors keep growing in importance. The number of inventors
listed on a patent has been growing over time and in our sample patents with
a single inventor account for about 35% of all patents — all other patents
are produced by teams, with teams of relatively small sizes (e.g. two or three
inventors) accounting for the largest share of patents. Panels A and B of
Appendix Figure A2 present these facts and Appendix Table A8 indicates
that the patterns are similar across technology classes.
As shown on Panel B of Appendix Figure A2, the distributions of team
sizes for real and placebo survivors track each other very closely, although
our matching algorithm did not use any information on team composition.
These distribution clearly differ from that of the full sample, which is due to a
selection effect: inventors who tend to work more in teams, and especially in
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larger teams, have more co-inventors and hence are more likely to experience
the premature death of one of them.
Teamwork is common, but inventors are more rarely part of multiple teams.
To establish this, we build team identifiers, where a team is defined as a unique
combination of (two or more) inventors listed on a patent. Panel A of Table 2
shows that the median number of teams per inventor is just one, although there
is a thick tail of inventors belonging to many teams. This panel also shows
that there is a high degree of overlap across teams. Considering inventors who
are part of at least two teams, on average the percentage of overlapping co-
inventors between two teams that any given inventor belongs to is 45%. This
number is a bit lower for real and placebo survivors relative to the full sample,
again due to a selection effect: it is more likely for an inventor to experience
co-inventor death if they have more distinct co-inventors.
Panel B of Table 2 shows that the composition of teams is very heteroge-
neous. First, teams members are not always co-located in the same commuting
zone. The degree of geographic dispersion increases with team size, although
for all team sizes at least 25% of co-inventors reside in the same commuting
zone.14 Second, team members can be very heterogeneous, in a way that is not
well predicted by team size. Panel B shows this by reporting the distribution
of the coefficient of variation for total earnings within teams, for various team
sizes. Within-team heterogeneity increases with team size, but relatively little,
while it greatly varies holding team size constant. Similar results hold with
other proxies for within-team heterogeneity, using other dispersion metrics
(standard deviation and Herfindahl index) and other outcomes (labor earn-
ings, applications, citations, age), as well as for the full sample of inventors, as
14Appendix Table A9 shows similar results for the full sample of inventors and at the
state level.
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reported in Appendix Tables A10 A11 and A12. For teams of two inventors,
we study the extent of assortative matching non-parametrically using the ab-
solute difference between outcomes for each of the co-inventors. The results,
reported in Appendix Figure A3 and Appendix Table A13, show that inven-
tors who are similar in characteristics like age and compensation tend to work
together, but only up to a point: there is wide variation in the composition of
inventor teams. Given the wide variety of team structures revealed by these
summary statistics, in Section V we investigate the question of which team
structures are most conducive to the accumulation of team-specific capital.
Appendix Table A6 presents descriptive evidence on team formation dy-
namics, from the point of view of the placebo survivors, around the time of
(counterfactual) co-inventor death. The placebo survivors do not add many
new co-inventors after the time of co-inventor death. Moreover, these new co-
inventors account for only 25% of their total patents after co-inventor death,
suggesting that the quality of these new matches is relatively low. These
patterns are not very different across age groups, although it appears that
younger inventors tend to add more co-inventors and innovate relatively more
with them, as if team-specific capital were easier to accumulate earlier in
an inventor’s career.15 Appendix Table A6 provides another illustration of
the “stickiness” of teams, which was already evident in Panel A of Table 2:
inventors work in a few teams only and tend to collaborate with the same
co-inventors across teams. We will use these facts to motivate our analysis of
possible mechanisms in Section V.
To further document that team composition features a significant degree
of stickiness, we consider teams that applied for a patent in 2002, in the full
15Appendix Table A7 presents complementary evidence on the likelihood of switching
EINs over time, from the perspective of the placebo inventors.
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Table 2—Summary Statistics on Inventor Teams
Panel A. Inventor-Level Statistics on Collaborations
Variable Sample Mean SD 10pc 25pc 50pc 75pc 90pc
Number of Teams Full Sample 2.58 4.17 1 1 1 3 5
per Inventor Real Survivors 2.83 4.45 1 1 1 3 6
Placebo Survivors 2.79 4.09 1 1 1 3 6
Distinct Co-Inventors Full Sample 2.32 3.0 1 1 1 3 5
per Inventor Real Survivors 3.45 3.79 1 1 2 5 9
Placebo Survivors 3.43 3.73 1 1 2 5 9
Degree of Overlap in Co-Inventors Full Sample 45.32 29.15 16.66 25 33.33 50 100
across Teams, for Inventors in at Real Survivors 31.82 20.84 12.90 18.33 25 37.5 50
Least Two Teams (%) Placebo Survivors 32.13 21.10 13.22 18.75 26.08 37.5 50
Panel B. Team-Level Statistics for Real and Placebo Survivors, by Team Size
Team Size Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
2 1.212 1 1 1 2 2
Number of Distinct 3 1.766 1 1 2 2 3
Commuting Zones 4 1.795 1 1 2 2 3
across Co-Inventors 5 2.057 1 1 2 3 3
6 2.312 1 1 2 3 4
2 0.391 0.051 0.150 0.330 0.609 0.945
Team Heterogeneity 3 0.434 0.065 0.158 0.346 0.612 0.999
(Coefficient of Variation for 4 0.414 0.084 0.199 0.372 0.611 0.950
Total Earnings, Within Team) 5 0.431 0.097 0.220 0.401 0.611 0.949
6 0.439 0.107 0.229 0.415 0.640 1.012
Notes: Panel A reports summary statistics at the inventor level for the various groups of inventors defined
in Section II.B. The statistics for the full sample are computed using data from 1999 to 2012. For the
deceased and survivor inventors, the statistics are computed using data before the year of death. Panel
B reports summary statistics at the team level, where a team is defined as a unique combination of more
than two inventors listed on a patent. For each team, the outcomes are measured in the year of a random
patent application prior to the year of death. See Appendix Table A9 for additional evidence on geographic
dispersion and Appendix Tables A10,A11,A12,A13 and Appendix Figure A3 for additional evidence on
within-team heterogeneity. For a detailed description of the data sources and sample construction, see
Sections II.A and II.B.
sample of inventors, and find that the probability that another patent applied
for by a member of the team between 1997 and 2007 also includes at least one
17
other member of the 2002 team is 30.4%. When conditioning on patents that
were assigned to different assignees16, the percentage falls but remains high,
at 21.6%. This suggests that teams are persistent across firm boundaries.17
Overall, the summary statistics on teams confirm the similarity between
real and placebo survivors and point to several directions for heterogeneity in
treatment effect by team structure, which we investigate and relate to common
hypotheses in the literature in Section V. Given that teams of two inventors
are the most frequent, and given that co-inventors often move together across
teams, we primarily conduct our causal analysis at the co-inventor level for
the remainder of the paper.
II. Estimating the Causal Effect of the Premature Death of a
Co-Inventor on an Inventor’s Compensation and Patents
This section presents our methodology to estimate the average treatment
effect of experiencing death of a coauthor on labor earnings, total earnings,
patents and citation-weighted patents. It then describes our main results and
a series of robustness checks.
A. Research Design
We want to build the counterfactual of compensation and patent produc-
tion for (real) survivor inventors, had they not experienced the premature
death of a co-inventor. Two main challenges arise to identify this causal ef-
fect. First, the real survivor inventors are on a different earnings and patent
trajectory than the full population of inventors. To address this challenge, we
16Assignees are the legal patent holders and are typically the employers of the inventors
on the patents.
17Similar results are obtained when considering other application years as the year of
reference. Appendix Table A14 documents that many teams span more than one EIN,
which means they most likely cross firm boundaries.
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use the control group of placebo survivor inventors described in Section II in
a difference-in-differences research design. Second, death may not be exoge-
nous to collaboration patterns.18 We show that the estimated causal effects of
co-inventor death are significant only after the year of death, which alleviates
this concern.
Figure 1 confirms non-parametrically that the real and placebo survivor
inventors are on similar earnings and patent trajectories before the time of
co-inventor death and sharply differ afterward.19 This bolsters the validity of
the research design, especially given that our match algorithm did not use any
information on survivor inventors. Real and placebo survivors have similar
levels of total earnings before death, but placebo survivors have higher labor
earnings than the real survivors before death, indicating that real survivors
have a higher share of their total earnings in the form of non-labor earnings
. The difference in labor earnings appears roughly constant, at around $2,500
(about 2% of labor earnings). In our regression framework, we use individual
fixed effects to absorb this difference.
Figure 1 shows that the earnings profile of survivor inventors flattens out
after the time of death, even for the placebo survivor inventors. This may be
due to curvature in the age profile of earnings, year fixed effects, or mechanical
effects induced by the construction of the sample of survivors. Citations are
declining over time, probably primarily due to truncation (patents applied for
and granted near the end of our sample do not have the opportunity of being
cited). Our regression framework takes all of these effects into account.
18We cannot think of very convincing examples of why this could be the case, but perhaps a
particularly bad collaboration may result in an inventor’s death. For a discussion of how pre-
trends can be interpreted as anticipation rather than endogeneity of treatment, seeMalani
and Reif (2015) .
19The figure plots the raw data, without imposing that mean outcomes in the treatment
and control groups should be equal prior to death.
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Figure 1 offers a transparent depiction of the data and is useful in gauging
the magnitude of the causal effect of co-inventor death on total earnings, labor
earnings and forward adjusted citations. However, it is not well suited to
a precise estimation of the causal effect - since covariates like age are not
perfectly balanced across treated and control groups - nor to robust inference.
Two types of clusters are important to take into account for inference: even
after controlling for a battery of fixed effects, there may be serial correlation
in an inventor’s outcomes over time and the outcomes of inventors linked to
the same deceased may be correlated. We cluster standard errors at the level
of the deceased inventors, which takes into account both forms of clustering.
20 21
B. Regression Framework
In order to study the dynamics of the effect, while at the same time prob-
ing the validity of the research design by testing whether there appears to be
any effect of losing a co-inventor before the event actually occurs, we use a
panel data model based on five elements, whose relevance has been discussed
in the previous subsection. First, we include a full set of leads and lags around
the co-inventor death for real survivor inventors (LRealit ). The predictive ef-
fects associated with these leads and lags are denoted {βReal(k)}9k=−9, where
k denotes time relative to death.22 If the identification assumption described
20We are close to observing the population of patent inventors who passed away prema-
turely between 1996 and 2012. Therefore, we interpret our standard errors with respect to
their superpopulation. In Appendix Table B12, we use the coupled bootstrap procedure of
? to estimate standard errors taking into account the matching step.
21We are close to observing the population of patent inventors who passed away prema-
turely between 1996 and 2012. Therefore, we interpret our standard errors with respect to
their superpopulation. In Appendix Table B12, we use the coupled bootstrap procedure of
? to estimate standard errors taking into account the matching step
22We drop observations where k is below -9 or above +9 because there are too few ob-
servations far away from death and the coefficients on these leads and lags are therefore
20


























-10 -5 0 5 10
Year Relative to Coinventor Death
Real Placebo



















-10 -5 0 5 10
Year Relative to Coinventor Death
Real Placebo
Figure 1. Path of Outcomes Around Co-inventor Death
imprecisely estimated. Results are qualitatively similar when all observations are kept.
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Figure 1. Path of Outcomes Around Co-inventor Death(continued)
Notes: Panels A to C of this figure show the path of mean total earnings, labor earnings and citations
for real and placebo survivor inventors around the year of co-inventor death. The sample includes all real
and placebo survivor inventors in a 9-year window around the year of co-inventor death, i.e. inventor-year
observations are dropped when the lead or lag relative to co-inventor death is above 9 years. The unbalanced
nature of this panel is the same for real and placebo inventors. Appendix Figure B2 shows that the results
are similar on a balanced sample. Dollar amounts are reported in 2012 dollars. Refer to Section II.B for
more details on the sample and to Section II.C for more details on the outcome variables.
below holds, βReal(k) denotes the causal effect of co-inventor death on the out-
come of interest k years after death. Second, we use a full set of leads and lags
around co-inventor death that is common to both real and placebo survivors
(LAllit ) - the corresponding predictive effects are denoted {βAll(k)}9k=−9. Lastly,
we introduce three distinct sets of fixed effects: age fixed effects (ait), year
fixed effects (γt) and individual fixed effects (αi).
We assume separability23 and specify the conditional expectation functions
as follows:
E[Yit|LRealit , LAllit , ait, t, i] = f(LRealit ) + f(LAllit ) + g(ait) + γ(t) + αi
We then estimate the model with a full set of fixed effects by OLS:24
23The results are qualitatively similar when interacting age and year fixed effects.















γm1{t=m} + αi + it
(1)
The main difference between our specification and the specifications used
in the existing literature relying on premature deaths for identification is that
we include a set of leads and lags around death that is common to both
real and placebo survivors (LAllit ), in addition to the set of leads and lags
around co-inventor death for the real survivors (LRealit ). This application of
the standard difference-in-differences estimator25 to our setting addresses the
concern that age, year and individual fixed effects may not fully account for
trends in life-time earnings and patents around co-inventor death. An inventor
from the sample to reduce variance, but the results are similar when these observations
are included. When the dependent variable is citation or patent counts, we use a Pois-
son estimator, with QMLE standard errors clustered at the deceased-inventor level. The
Poisson estimator with individual fixed effects fails to converge in our sample, therefore we
report results without individual fixed effects and, as a robustness check, we run the same
specifications with a negative binomial estimator with fixed effects. Note that we use quasi-
maximum likelihood methods, therefore we obtain consistent estimates with Poisson even
without imposing that the mean should be equal to the variance and even with non-integer
data (for a formal reference, see?. Also note that these specifications, whether with OLS or
Poisson, suffer from the standard collinearity between year, age and individual fixed effects.
We drop two of the age fixed effects, as is standard practice. This does not affect our esti-
mates of βRealk , which are the estimates of interest. Our econometrics appendix, Appendix
E, offers an in-depth discussion of these issues.
25In the standard difference-in-differences estimator, treatment occurs at only one point in
time and the regression includes a Treated dummy for the treatment group, a Treated×Post
dummy turning to one after treatment for the treated, and a Post dummy common to both
the treated and control groups. In our setting, where co-inventors death are staggered over
time, LAllit plays a role analogous to the Post dummy and L
Real
it plays a role analogous to
the Treated×Post dummy. Using our notation for point estimates in specification (2), the
standard difference-in-differences specification is:
Yit = αTreatedi + β
AllPostit + β
RealTreated× Post+ it
Note that in our research design, the matching step creates a situation where the placebo
survivors inherit the counterfactual year of death associated with their placebo deceased
inventor (and the corresponding real deceased inventor).
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must necessarily have invented a patent before the year of (real or placebo)
co-inventor death and is more likely to have been employed at that time, even
conditional on a large set of fixed effects. Therefore, the construction of the
sample of survivor inventors might mechanically induce a bias that the fixed
effects do not fully address, and indeed we find that the set of leads and lags
LAllit has substantial predictive power for certain outcomes like employment.
Intuitively, the leads and lags that are common to both real and placebo
survivors (LAllit ) capture the mechanical effects, while the leads and lags that
are specific to the real survivors (LRealit ) capture the causal effect of co-inventor
death.
Formally, if E[1{LAllit =k}it|LRealit , LAllit , ait, t, i] = 0 ∀(t, k), then βReal(k) gives
the causal effect of co-inventor death on the outcome of interest k years af-
ter death. Appendix D formally derives what is identified in this model and
how the predictive effects {βReal(k)}9k=−9 can be used to probe the validity of
the research design and identify causal effects. It also compares our specifi-
cation to those commonly used in the literature using premature deaths for
identification.
In the next subsection, we use specification (1) to confirm the validity of the
research design and study the dynamics of the effect. To summarize the results
and discuss magnitudes, we employ a second specification, with a dummy
turning to one after the time of co-inventor death for real survivor inventors
(AfterDeathRealit ) and another dummy turning to one after the time of co-
inventor death for both real and placebo survivor inventors (AfterDeathAllit ).
Under our identification assumption, βReal gives the average causal effect of
death.26 This specification is as follows:
26We have relatively more deaths occurring later in our sample and, as a result, βReal
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(2)
C. Results
Figure 2 reports the point estimates and 95% confidence interval for the
coefficients βRealk , obtained from specification (1). Four outcome variables are
considered: total earnings, labor earnings, non-labor earnings and citations.
The point estimate on the lag turning to one in the year preceding death is
normalized to 0 and inference is carried out relative to this lag.27 We observe
no pre-trending for any of the outcome variables, which lends credibility to the
research design. The effect of co-inventor death on compensation and patents
appears to manifest itself gradually: total earnings, labor earnings, non-labor
earnings and citations all start to decline gradually after the death of a co-
inventor. In line with the event studies in Figure 1, the nonparametric fixed
effects for each lead and lag around death thus indicate that the nature of
the effect is a change in the slope of the outcomes, rather than a level shift,
and that co-inventor death has effects beyond short-term disruption of team-
work. As further discussed in Section IV, the gradual nature of the effect is
consistent with the view that co-inventor death impedes future co-invention
activities: innovation is a stochastic process and the placebo survivors gradu-
ally outperform the real survivors.
The magnitude of the effects is large. Eight years after the time of co-
to long-run effects. All results in the paper are about the average treatment effect on the
treated.
27The full set of leads and lags LRealit always sum up to one for the survivor inventors and
our specification includes individual fixed effects, therefore one of the leads and lags must
be “normalized” to one. Appendix D discusses this standard normalization more formally.
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inventor death, the real survivor inventors’ total earnings are $7,000 lower
(4% of mean total earnings in the sample of survivors), their labor earnings
are about $5,800 lower (3.8% of mean labor earnings in the sample of survivors)
and their citation-weighted patent production is 15% lower than it would have
been had they not experienced the premature death of a co-inventor.28 About
80% of the total decline in earnings is due to a decline in labor earnings. We
formally test the hypotheses the point estimates are all the same before 29
death, but we can after death.30
In order to reduce noise, we use specification (2), with a single indicator
turning to one after the year of co-inventor death for real survivor inventors.
The results are reported in Table 3. We use thresholds corresponding to the
extensive margin, the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the total earnings and
labor earnings distributions to characterize heterogeneity in the effect across
the income distribution.
Table 3 shows large and statistically significant coefficients βReal for all
outcome variables, consistent with the dynamic specifications reported in Fig-
28The magnitude of the decline in citation-weighted patents is in line with the literature
on peer effects in science. In life sciences,Azoulay, Graff Zivin and Wang (2010) find that
collaborators experience a 8% decline in quality-adjusted publications after the death of
a “star” scientist. Oettl (2012), who also studies “star” scientists, finds a corresponding
decline of 16% in immunology. Based on the dismissal of Jewish scientists by the Nazi
government, Waldinger (2011) shows that losing a coauthor of average quality reduces the
average researcher’s publication record by 13% in physics and 16.5% in chemistry.
29Bell et al. (2016) conduct event studies of inventor labor and non-labor earnings around
the time of patent application and find that inventors’ returns to innovation materialize
gradually around the time of patent application in the form of both labor and non-labor
earnings.
30In Appendix Tables B5 and B6, we show the raw event study and the point estimates
from the full dynamic specification for the number of patents. The results are similar to
those for citation-weighted patents.
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Figure 2. Dynamic Causal Effects of Co-Inventor Death
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Figure 2. Dynamic Causal Effects of Co-inventor Death (continued)
Notes:Panels A to D of this figure shows the estimated βRealk coefficients from specification (1) for four
outcome variables. Standard errors are clustered around the deceased inventors. Under the identification
assumption described in Section III.B, βRealk gives the causal effect of co-inventor death in year k relative to
co-inventor death. In panel D, the variable is the count of forward citations received on patents the survivor
applied for in a given year. Therefore, this variable reflects the timing and quality of patent applications
by the survivor, not the timing of citations. Adjusted forward citations are winsorized at the 0.1% level.
Dollar amounts are reported in 2012 dollars. The sample includes all real and placebo survivor inventors in
a 9-year window around the year of co-inventor death, i.e. inventor-year observations are dropped when the
lead or lag relative to co-inventor death is above 9 years. The unbalanced nature of this panel is the same
for real and placebo inventors. Appendix Table B6 shows that the results are similar on a balanced panel.
For more details on the outcome variables, refer to Section II.C.
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-ure 2. The effect exists across the distribution of total earnings, and it
seems larger in lower quantiles - a finding we will probe further in Section
IV.Interestingly, βAll is significant for two outcomes: non-labor earnings and
the extensive margin of labor earnings. The point estimates are large in mag-
nitude relative to the point estimates for βReal, which shows that controlling
for mechanical patterns is important to avoid bias, even when age, year and
individual fixed effects are included. Panel C of Table 3 shows that co-inventor
death has large and significant effects for both the quantity of quality of patents
produced by survivor inventors.31
D. Additional Results and Robustness Checks
Balanced Panel. We have confirmed that our results are robust to re-
stricting attention to a balanced panel, focusing on survivors whose associated
deceased passed away between 2003 and 2008 and considering a four-year win-
dow around death for each of these survivors. The results are presented in
Appendix Table B6 and are similar to the results using the unbalanced panel.
Long-Term Persistence. The finding that co-inventor death has a lon-
-glasting effect is a striking result of this paper. Appendix Table B3 confirms
31The results for βReal reported in Table 3 are similar when running the following speci-
fication, which replaces AfterDeathAllit in specification (2) with a full set of leads and lags












We have also checked that the results obtained with the Poisson estimator for count data
are qualitatively similar when using OLS instead.
29
Table 3—Causal Effects of Co-inventor Death
Panel A. Survivor Inventor’s Total Earnings and Non-Labor Earnings
Total Earnings >p25 >p50 >p75 Non-Labor Earnings
AfterDeathReal -3,873 -0.01531 -0.0107 -0.00772 -1,199
s.e. (910) (0.00434) (0.00457) (0.0039) (498)
AfterDeathAll - 223 0.00036 0.00066 -0.00068 651
s.e. (537) (0.00285) (0.00314) (0.00297) (378)
Age and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Observations 325,726 325,726 325,726 325,726 325,726
# Survivors 27,500 27,500 27,500 27,500 27,500
# Deceased 9,428 9,428 9,428 9,428 9,428
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Panel B. Survivor Inventor’s Labor Earnings
Labor Earnings >0 >p25 >p50 >p75
AfterDeathReal -2,715 -0.00913 -0.01039 -0.007203 -0.00638
s.e. (706) (0.00315) (0.00411) (0.0037) (0.00342)
AfterDeathAll -38 -0.0051 -0.00259 -0.00066 0.00127
s.e. (480) (0.00221) (0.00295) (0.00322) (0.003)
Age and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Observations 325,726 325,726 325,726 325,726 325,726
# Survivors 27,500 27,500 27,500 27,500 27,500
# Deceased 9,428 9,428 9,428 9,428 9,428
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
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Table 3—Causal Effects of Co-inventor Death (continued)
Panel C: Survivor Inventor’s Patent Applications and Forward Citations
Patent Count Citation Count Count of Patents Count of Patents
with No Citations in Top 5% of Citations
AfterDeathReal -0.09121 -0.09024 -0.07656 -0.02182
s.e. (0.02063) (0.02326) (0.0217) (0.00789)
AfterDeathAll 0.00055 0.04084 0.00325 0.00455
s.e. (0.01776) (0.03016) (0.02662) (0.00554)
Age and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Fixed Effects No No No No
# Observations 325,726 325,726 325,726 325,726
# Survivors 27,500 27,500 27,500 27,500
# Deceased 9,428 9,428 9,428 9,428
Estimator Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Notes:Panels A, B and C report the estimated coefficients βReal and βAll from specification (2) for a
range of outcome variables. Several outcomes in Panels A and B are indicator variables equal to one when
the inventor’s earnings are above a given quantile of the earnings distribution. Panel C does not include
individual fixed effects because the Poisson estimator with individual fixed effects did not converge for
several of the citation outcomes. Appendix Table B10 shows that the results are similar with individual
fixed effects, using a negative binomial estimator. The four citation outcome variables in Panel C are as
follows: (1) patent count is the number of patents the survivor inventor applied for in a given year; (2)
citation count is the number of forward citations received on patents that the survivor applied for in a given
year (therefore, this variable reflects the timing and quality of patent applications by the survivor, not the
timing of citations); (3) the count of patents with no citations is the number of patents that the survivor
inventor applied for in a given year and that have never been cited as of December 2012; (4) the count of
patents in the top 5% of citations is the number of patents the survivor inventor applied for in a given year
that were in the top 5% of the citation distribution, where the distribution is computed based on all patents
that were cited, applied for in the same year and in the same technology class (we aggregate USPC classes
into six main technology classes, as is common in the literature). The sample includes all real and placebo
survivor inventors in a 9-year window around the year of co-inventor death, i.e. inventor-year observations
are dropped when the lead or lag relative to co-inventor death is more than 9 years. The unbalanced nature
of this panel is the same for real and placebo inventors. Appendix Table B6 shows that the results are
similar on a balanced panel. Standard errors are clustered around the deceased inventors.
that the effect becomes larger over time in a statistically significant way, using
a specification with an indicator turning to one for observations more than
four years after death (which reduces the noise reflected by the standard errors
shown on Figure 2). A potential concern when studying the dynamics of the
effect is related to how unbalanced the panel is with respect to years before and
after the death of the co-inventor. For example, recent deaths have many pre-
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death observations but few post-death observations while the opposite holds
for early deaths in the sample. The dynamic specification can confound true
dynamics due to the changing composition of the sample.32 To address this
issue, Appendix Figure B2 shows the path of total earnings for real and placebo
survivor inventors experiencing death of their co-inventor between 2003 and
2005. This allows us to track the same individuals over time and confirms
that the effect of coauthor death is indeed gradual and long-lasting. The
regression results are presented in Appendix Table B4 and are qualitatively
similar to the findings reported in Figure 2. In Section V, we show that the
long-term persistence of co-inventor death is likely explained by the fact that
team-specific capital is accumulated over time, as a collaboration unfolds, and
it is therefore difficult for inventors to reconstitute it and come back to trend.
Explaining why the effect appears gradually. The slow dissipation
of rents from previous collaborations is a potentially important reason why
the causal effect of co-inventor death manifests itself gradually, as shown by
the changes in slopes on the various panels of Figure 2. Intuitively, innovation
can be viewed as a Poisson process with an inventor-specific rate of success
λi. Assume that when an inventor loses a co-inventor, their probability of
successful innovation drops discontinuously to s · λi, with s < 1, because the
loss of a co-inventor makes them less productive. Then, the path of their inno-
vation outcomes (patents and citations) and returns to innovation (earnings)
will not drop suddenly but, rather, will feature a gradual decline because the
32For example, it could be that inventors who experience death of a coauthor earlier in the
sample are of higher ability than inventors who experience death of a coauthor later in the
sample, which would manifest itself as larger long-run than short-run effects of death that
are entirely due to changing sample composition rather than dynamic cumulative impacts.
Similarly, one could imagine that earlier deaths in the sample had a bigger impact than
later deaths but the impacts are constant following death: again, this would induce larger
long-run than short-run effects, resulting from changing composition rather than dynamic
cumulative impacts.
32
rents from previous collaboration dissipate slowly. For instance, the survivor
may be much less productive in the year immediately following co-inventor
death, but it typically takes more than a year to successfully invent and file a
new patent. Therefore the measured difference in number of patents between
the real and placebo survivors will be small in the first year, although the
underlying difference in innovation rates may be highest then.33 We show the
relevance of this channel by documenting in Appendix Tables B1 and B2 that
the effect is gradual primarily in technology categories with a slow “speed of
patenting”.34 In technology categories where it takes less time to invent, the
effect of co-inventor death is still long-lasting (we investigate the reason why
in Section V) but much less gradual than in technology categories where it
takes a longer time. In our preferred specification, we proxy for the speed
of patenting in a technology class using a citation lag measure, the average
number of years between the application dates of the citing and cited patents.
We discuss in Appendix B robustness checks using alternative proxies.
Additional Robustness Checks. Appendix B reports a series of addi-
tional robustness checks showing that the results do not stem from lingering
health conditions (Appendix Figure B3 and Table B7), are similar with a
propensity-score reweighting strategy (Appendix Figure B4 and Table B8),
are robust to considering alternative measures of citations (Appendix Tables
B9 and B10), and are robust across technology classes (Appendix Table B11).
We also show that the results preserve strong statistical significance with an
inference procedure taking into account the matching step (Appendix Table
33The same logic applies to income differences, assuming that inventors are rewarded for
their successful innovations, in line with the evidence from earnings event studies around
patent application presented in Toivanen and Va¨a¨na¨nen (2012) or Finland, Depalo, Addario
and Lucia (2014) for Italy, and Bell et al. (2016) for the US.
34An alternative explanation for the gradual nature of the effect is convex returns to team
building, which we test and reject in Section V.
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B12) and are similar when using log transformations and non-winsorized vari-
ables (Appendix Tables B13 and B14).
III. Does Team-Specific Capital Matter?
In this section, we show that the long-lasting decline in earnings and ci-
tations caused by the premature death of a co-inventor stems from the fact
that the survivor lost a co-inventor with whom they were collaborating ex-
tensively. We first rule out alternative mechanisms that are not specific to
the team. Second, we show that, within the team, the effect is not driven by
asymmetric top-down spillovers from unusually high-achieving deceased inven-
tors. Third, we demonstrate that the intensity of the collaboration between
the deceased and the survivor inventors prior to death is an important predic-
tor of the magnitude of the effect. Fourth, we document that the majority of
the effect results from the fact that the survivor can no longer co-invent with
the deceased: when considering only patents that were invented by the sur-
vivor without the deceased, the effect becomes much smaller. Together, these
facts indicate that team-specific capital is likely to be a central mechanism
explaining the findings from Section III.
A. Ruling Out Mechanisms That Are Not Specific to the Team
Firm disruption and network effects. We first investigate whether
disruption of the firm or diffuse network effects are important channels. To do
so, we consider the groups of real and placebo coworkers and second-degree
connections.35
35The coworkers are the inventors who were in the same firm as the deceased in the year
prior to death. The second-degree connection are the co-inventors of the co-inventors of the
deceased. Refer to Section II for more details about the definition of these groups and the
construction of the sample.
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Figure 3. Path of Outcomes for Coworkers and Second-Degree Connections
Around Death
Notes: This figure shows the path of mean total earnings for real and placebo coworkers as well as for
real and placebo second-degree connections around the year of death of their associated deceased. The
sample includes all real and placebo inventors in a 9-year window around the year of co-inventor death, i.e.
inventor-year observations are dropped when the lead or lag relative to co-inventor death is above 9 years.
The unbalanced nature of this panel is the same for real and placebo inventors. Dollar amounts are reported
in 2012 dollars. Refer to section II.B for more details on the sample and to section II.C for more details on
the outcome variables.
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Figure 3 shows that the real and placebo coworkers and the real and placebo
second-degree connections follow similar earnings paths both before and after
the year of death of their associated deceased.36 Appendix Figure C1 shows
similar results for the paths of labor earnings and citations. This stands in
sharp contrast with the diverging paths of real and placebo survivors after
co-inventor death, presented in Figure 1.
Appendix Table C1 reports the results obtained from specification (2) and
shows that the premature death of an inventor has no significant negative
effect on their coworkers and second-degree connections. The point estimates
for the various outcome variables are generally one or two orders of magnitude
smaller than the point estimates obtained for the direct co-inventors and are
relatively precisely estimated.
We find small and significant positive effects of an inventor’s death on
their coworkers’ likelihood of being employed as well as on their patent and
citation counts. Therefore, the large negative effect on the direct co-inventors
of the deceased documented in Section III do not result from the disruption of
the firm or the R&D lab following an inventor’s death.37 The positive effect
on coworkers may result from substitutability between inventors at the same
firm: an inventor’s earnings and patent production might rise after the death
of a coworker because it increases this inventor’s chance of being promoted
and their access to resources within the firm.38 We have checked that similar
36The path of earnings for coworkers and second-degree connections - whether real or
placebo - exhibits strong curvature around the time of (real or placebo) death. This cur-
vature is partly captured by year and age effects. It also results from the fact that we
impose that the coworkers should be employed in the year preceding death and that the
second-degree connection should have co-invented with the survivors prior to death.
37We provide additional evidence confirming this fact by showing that the effect persists
for co-inventors located in different firms (as proxied for by EINs) at the time of death
(Appendix Table C17) and that the magnitude of the effect is not correlated with firm size
(Appendix Table C22).
38Further exploration of the mechanism at play for coworkers is beyond the scope of this
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results hold when we restrict attention to coworkers that were in the same
commuting zone as the deceased in the year prior to death: see Appendix
Table C3.
For the second-degree connections, we find no statistically significant effect
on any of the outcomes. The point estimates are close to zero and we can reject
at the 5% confidence level any effect of a magnitude larger than one half of the
effect documented for the direct co-inventors. This evidence provides a test
of competing models of strategic interactions in networks. If the dominant
force is a substitution effect as in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) , then we
should find that the second-degree connections benefit from the death. But if
strategic complementarities dominate as in Bramoulle´, Kranton and D’amours
(2014) , then the death should negatively affect the second-degree connections.
Our finding that, on net, the effect on second-degree connections is negligible
means that network effects are not first-order, as opposed to the direct impact
on co-inventors.
Therefore, we can rule out firm disruption and network effects as primary
mechanisms explaining the effect documented in Section III.39 Moreover, the
analysis of the effect on coworkers and second-degree connections generates
new insights about the innovation production function: the results suggest
that inventors within a firm are substitutable while there is no strong comple-
mentarity or substitutability patterns between inventors who are two nodes
paper, but our results are consistent with those obtained in parallel work by Ja¨ger (2016) ,
who studies small firms in Germany rather than the population of inventors, as we do.
39We have also constructed a “citation network” of inventors who cited the deceased before
their death but who were not among their direct co-inventors, second-degree connections or
coworkers. We do not find evidence of statistically significant negative effects. These results
are not surprising, given how diffuse citation networks are, but they establish that the effect
is not driven by linkages in idea space. These results are available from the authors upon
request.
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away in the co-invention network.40
Loss of firm-specific capital. To rule out that the effect is driven by
the loss of traditional firm-specific capital, we show that the effect persists
even when inventors were located in different firms at the time of co-inventor
death. Since EINs are an imperfect measure of firms, we focus on a subsample
where either the deceased or the survivor is located in an academic EIN, and
the other works for an EIN in the private sector, which unambiguously guar-
antees that they were indeed working for different entities. Considering such
collaborations, we report in Appendix Table C13 that the effect persists and
is similar in magnitude to the effect in the full sample. We conduct a series of
related exercises in Appendix C. First, as another way of ruling out the loss of
traditional firm-specific capital as an important driver of the effect, we show
that the effect is of a similar magnitude for inventors who do not switch EINs
after co-inventor death (Appendix Table C15). Second, we show that the ef-
fect persists for inventors located in different EINs and in different commuting
zones prior to co-inventor death, suggesting that team-specific capital is not
tied to firm or geographic boundaries (Appendix Table C17).41
Ruling out other mechanisms. We examine other mechanisms in which
team-specific capital plays no role in Appendix C, including the loss of “person-
40Our quasi-experiment does not deliver insights about general substitution and comple-
mentarity patterns in the patent production function or in extended co-inventor networks.
Indeed, the reduced-form effects we identify correspond to the idiosyncratic effect of an in-
ventor on their coworkers and second-degree connections. It could be that the production
function exhibits strong complementarities between coworkers, and yet that the causal effect
of the premature death of an inventor’s coworker on this inventor’s earnings and patents
is a precise zero, simply because this coworker can be replaced. Our analysis shows that
co-inventors are a source of specific value for an inventor, in a way that coworkers and
second-degree connections are not. See Appendix C for a complete discussion.
41The limitations of these additional tests are that, in the first case, we are condition-
ing on an endogenous outcome and, in the second case, there remains ambiguity about
whether different EINs really correspond to different firms. Appendix Table C14 documents
heterogeneity in the treatment effect for teams in academia versus the private sector.
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specific capital” (the idea that a given inventor may be irreplaceable to anyone
who ever collaborated with them, regardless of team dynamics), emotional
distress, disruption of current work, and changes in physical inputs available
to survivor inventors, among others.
B. Top-Down Spillovers Are Not the Driving Force
As mentioned in Section II, some teams are composed of inventors of similar
age and compensation levels, while in others there are large gaps in age and
compensation levels between team members. We study whether these patterns
are important predictors of the heterogeneity in the average effects documented
in Section III. In particular, we want to test whether the effect is driven by
the death of “superstar” inventors or, more generally, by inventors of higher
ability level than their associated survivors.
To do so, we repeat the estimation of the coefficient of interest, βReal , by
using specification (2) in different subsamples of the data. We partition the
data depending on the quartile in which the total earnings of the (real and
placebo) deceased and the (real and placebo) survivor inventors fall three years
before the year of (real and placebo) death. The sample sizes in each subsample
are given in Appendix Table C4. This way of inferring relative ability levels
can potentially create mean reversion patterns. For instance, it could be that
survivor inventors who are in the first quartile of the earnings distribution
three years before co-inventor death suffered from temporary shocks and that
their earnings tend, on average, to increase afterwards. The use of our control
group of placebo survivor inventors is sufficient to alleviate these concerns if
the income processes are similar for the real and placebo survivor inventors
prior to the death of the co-inventor (i.e. both groups are affected by mean
reversion and other such patterns in similar ways). To investigate whether this
39
is true, we examine the distribution of changes in total earnings for the years
before the death of the co-inventor. The difference in this analysis relative
to our earlier analysis in Section III is that we now want to ensure that the
placebo survivor inventors are an appropriate control group for the distribution
of changes in potential outcomes over time, not just for their mean. Appendix
Table C5 shows that the distribution of earnings changes is very similar for
the real and placebo survivor inventors.42
Table 4 reports the results of this analysis with total earnings as the out-
come. Three main findings stand out. First, the effect is significant and large
in magnitude when the deceased and the survivor are in the same earnings
quartile, i.e. are of similar seniority levels. This rejects the hypothesis that
the effect documented in Section III is entirely driven by top-down spillovers
from “superstar” inventors, because the effect persists for inventors of similar
seniority levels. Second, holding constant the earnings quartile of the survivor,
the effect is increasing in the earnings quartile of the deceased, showing that
co-inventors of a higher seniority level are more difficult to substitute for. In
other words, although top-down spillovers are not the entire story, they are
very much part of the story. Third, the effect is not significant when the de-
ceased is in a lower earnings quartile than the survivor. Although the point
estimates are imprecisely estimated, it suggests that co-inventors of a lower
seniority level are not a source of specific value for an inventor. The fact that
lower ability team members suffer from the loss of higher ability team mem-
bers, while in contrast higher ability team members are largely unaffected by
the loss of a lower ability peer, could indicate that lower ability inventors ex-
tract “rents” from their collaboration with high ability co-inventors. However,
42We obtain similar results when considering changes of total earnings in levels as well as
level or log changes for labor earnings.
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this “rent” hypothesis cannot explain the large effect we find for team members
of similar ability levels.
Moreover, Appendix Table C7 shows that mechanical patterns (due to
mean reversion or other statistical effects) play a very important role. This
table shows that there are strong mean-reversion patterns: survivors in the
lowest earnings quartile before (placebo) co-inventor death tend to perform
better after the year of death, while survivors in the highest earnings quartile
before (placebo) co-inventor death tend to perform worse after the year of
death. Therefore, year, age and individual fixed effects are not sufficient to
account for trends in earnings around the time of co-inventor death and it is
important to include the AfterDeathAll dummy introduced in specification
(2).
We have confirmed the robustness of these results. First, similar results
hold with other outcome variables, as shown in Appendix Tables C6 and C7 for
labor earnings. Second, we obtain similar findings when we measure relative
ability using citations instead of earnings. Panel A of Appendix Table C8
shows these results.43 Moreover, Panel B of Appendix Table C8 shows that
the effect is much larger when the deceased was a “star”, in the top 2% of
the citation distribution. Our results are therefore consistent with Azoulay,
Graff Zivin and Wang (2010): stars have a very large impact on the people
they work with. However, we have shown above that the average treatment
effect we document in this paper is not driven by stars - it persists in samples
that exclude these very high-achieving individuals. Finally, instead of running
the analysis in different subsamples as in Table 4, we ran regressions with an
43A limitation of using relative citations before death is that the survivor and the deceased
have often co-invented most of their patents together, therefore relative earnings appear to
be a better signal of relative seniority.
41
interaction between treatment status and the quartile difference or the level
difference in the labor earnings levels of the survivor and the deceased, as well
as with the age difference between the survivor and the deceased.
Table 4—Heterogeneity by Relative Ability Levels of Co-Inventors
Deceased Earnings Quartile / Survivor Earnings Quartile 1 2 3 4
1 -2,652 -1,301 1,298 902
s.e. (1,553) (1,328) (1,680) (1,081)
2 -3,573 -2,798 -810 -1,308
s.e. (2,111) (1,178) (1,675) (1,278)
3 -5,656 -4,151 -3,243 -2,939
s.e. (2,612) (1,968) (1,632) (2,562)
4 -6,566 -5,132 -4,853 -7,037
s.e. (3,450) (2,530) (2,650) (3,256)
Notes: This panel reports the estimated coefficient βReal from specification (2), with total earnings of the sur-
vivors as the outcome variable, in sixteen subsamples of the data. Each of these subsamples corresponds to a
different combination of the total earnings quartiles of the survivor and the deceased. The earnings quartiles are
computed three years before death and sample sizes for each subsample are given in Appendix Table C4. Under
the identification assumption described in Section III.B, βReal gives the causal effect of co-inventor death on total
earnings. For instance, the panel shows that if the survivor and the deceased were both in the lowest quartile
of total earnings three years before death, the causal effect of co-inventor death on the survivor was a decline of
$2,652 in total earnings. Amounts are reported in 2012 dollars. Standard errors are clustered around the deceased
inventors.
C. The Role of Team-Specific Capital: the Effect Is Driven by Close-Knit
Teams and Joint Production
Heterogeneity in the treatment effect across team structures and outcomes
suggests that team-specific capital drives the effect. First, we show that the
effect is much larger in “close-knit” teams, characterized by an intense history
of collaboration. Second, we show that the effect on patents is driven by
co-invention activities, rather than by knowledge transmission. Finally, we
show that the effect is bigger in teams where the survivors were interacting
collectively with the deceased, rather than in a series of dyadic interactions.
Heterogeneity by intensity of collaboration. We consider various
measures of collaboration intensity between deceased and survivor inventors,
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which Table 5 shows vary widely in our sample. Specifically, we use the num-
ber and share of patents the survivor inventor co-invented with the deceased,
collaboration length (defined as the number of years between the first and last
joint patent application between the survivor and the deceased), and collab-
oration recency (defined as the numbers of years between the death of the
co-inventor and the application for the last co-invented patent with the sur-
vivor).
To examine whether heterogeneity in collaboration strength predicts het-
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where Xi is a vector including all variables listed in Table 5, as well as the
age of the survivor inventor at the time of death. The vector Xi is demeaned
so that the point estimates for βReal and βAll are left unaffected.44
Table 6 reports the results for the relevant interaction terms. It shows that
the various proxies for the intensity of the collaboration between the survivor
inventor and the deceased (co-patent share, collaboration length and collab-
oration recency) are strong predictors of the magnitude of the causal effect
of co-inventor death on the various outcomes. Using the standard deviations
reported in Table 5 for the various regressors and the magnitude of the causal
effects reported in Table 3, we can gauge the magnitude of the predictive ef-
fects. A one standard deviation increase in the share of copatents explains
75% of the average effect on total earnings, 78% of the average effect on labor
44In Appendix Table C18, we report the results by introducing the interaction terms one
at a time, with total earnings as the outcome.
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Table 5—Collaboration Patterns Between Deceased and Survivor Inventors Before
Death
Variable Sample Mean SD 10pc 25pc 50pc 75pc 90pc
# Patents Real 8.114 17.285 1 1 3 9 18
Placebo 7.41082 12.757 1 1 3 8 18
# Co-patents Real 1.702 1.502 1 1 1 2 3
Placebo 1.6108 1.394 1 1 1 2 3
Co-patent Share Real 54.61 37.75 7.692 18.75 50 100 100
Placebo 54.55 37.81 8.33 18.18 50 100 100
Collaboration Length Real 0.8208 1.7393 0 0 0 1 3
Placebo 0.7593 1.7050 0 0 0 1 3
Collaboration Recency Real 6.1125 3.9756 1 3 6 9 12
Placebo 5.673 4.0078 1 2 5 8 12
# Real Survivors 14,150
# Placebo Survivors 13,350
Notes: The variables are defined as follows: (1) # patents is the number of patents of the survivor before co-
inventor death; (2) # co-patents is the number of patents co-invented by the survivor and the deceased before
co-inventor death; (3) co-patent share is the share of the survivor’s patents that were co-invented with the
deceased before death; (4) collaboration length is the number of years that elapsed between the first and last
joint patent application between the survivor and the deceased; (5) collaboration recency is the number of years
that elapsed between the application year for the last patent co-invented by the survivor and the deceased and
the year of co-inventor death.
earnings, 70% of the average effect on patent count, and 54% of the average
effect on citation count. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in col-
laboration length explains 47% of the average effect on total earnings, 33%
of the average effect on labor earnings, 46% of the average effect on patents,
and 53% of the average effect on citations. Lastly, a one standard deviation
increase in collaboration recency explains 45% of the average effect on total
earnings, 52% of the average effect of labor earnings, 22% of the average effect
on patents, and 21% of the average effect on citations. This indicates that the
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Table 6—Heterogeneity by Intensity of Collaboration Between Deceased and
Survivors
ηReal Total Earnings Labor Earnings Non-Labor Earnings Patent Count Citation Count
Co-patent Share -75.132 -56.669 -17.236 -0.00172 -0.0013
s.e. (22.552) (17.164) (8.342) (0.00085) (0.00069)
Collaboration Length -1,063.253 -523.296 -323.296 -0.0245 -0.02892
s.e. (405.382) (228.55) (118.516) (0.01072) (0.01537)
Collaboration Recency 447.921 360.281 110.728 0.00508 0.00482
s.e. (145.592) (139.825) (50.95) (0.00256) (0.00266)
# Co-patents 42.163 64.029 20.231 0.0015 0.00127
s.e. (107.372) (121.255) (431.156) (0.01962) (0.0124)
# Patents -49.129 5.022 -60.001 -0.00642 -0.00442
s.e. (57.941) (39.44) (40.223) (0.00287) (0.00181)
Survivor’s Age at Death 104.78 40.961 50.899 - 0.00243 -0.00323
s.e. (62.774) (49.876) (40.85) (0.001073) (0.00129)
Age and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No
# Observations 325,726 325,726 325,726 325,726 325,726
# Survivors 27,500 27,500 27,500 27,500 27,500
# Deceased 9,428 9,428 9,428 9,428 9,428
Estimator OLS OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
Notes: This table reports the estimated coefficients in the vectorηReal from specification (3). The regressors are
defined in the main text as well as in Table 5 and are demeaned so that the point estimates for the average causal
effects are identical to Table 3. Standard errors are clustered around the deceased inventors.
effect is driven by the loss of a co-inventor that the survivor was collaborating
with extensively.45
Joint production. Consistent with the team-specific capital interpreta-
tion, we find that the effect of co-inventor death is much larger in the context
of joint production. We repeat the analysis of the effect of co-inventor death
45Our results differ markedly from Azoulay, Graff Zivin and Wang (2010), who do not
find collaboration intensity to be predictive of the magnitude of the effect of the death of a
superstar on their coauthors. It could be due to the fact that top-down spillovers, which are
not the driving force in our data, do not strongly depend on the intensity of collaboration.
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on the patents of the survivor, but now we only consider patents that were
not co-invented with the deceased.46
Table 7 reports that, for the various measures of patent production and
citations, we consistently find a significant and negative effect of co-inventor
death. Continued interaction with a co-inventor therefore benefits an inventor
beyond co-inventions, which is consistent with the view of teams as a vehicle
for knowledge transmission. However, the magnitude of the effect on the
survivor’s patents outside of patents with the deceased is much smaller (around
-3%) relative to the effect on the total number of patents of the survivor
documented in Table 3 (around -9%). This suggests that the main value of
team-specific capital comes in the form of co-inventions and that the effect
results from the fact that the survivor can no longer engage in joint projects
with the deceased.47
Heterogeneity by degree of co-invention overlap. We find that the
effect on survivors is larger when they were collectively interacting with the
deceased. We average the share of patents in common between all survivors
associated with a given deceased as a measure of co-invention overlap in this
deceased’s set of co-inventors. Appendix Table C9 shows that the effect in-
creases by about 10% for all of our outcomes when the degree of co-invention
overlap increases by one standard deviation. This finding suggests that there
are negative feedback effects when more collaborators in a given inventor’s n-
46Note that legal requirements impose that all inventors should be listed on a patent,
otherwise the patent could be invalidated in court. We can therefore be confident that the
patents that do no list the name of the deceased were indeed invented without the active
collaboration of the deceased.
47Note that our results are very different from Azoulay, Graff Zivin and Wang (2010)
, who find that the death of a “star” scientist causes a decline of similar magnitude in
scientific publications with and without the deceased. In our setting, the importance of
joint production between the deceased and the survivor is consistent with the gradual effect
documented in Section III: innovation is a stochastic process and the placebo survivors
gradually outperform the real survivors.
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Table 7—The Causal Effect of Co-inventor Death On the Survivor Beyond Joint
Production
Only Considering Patents that Were Not Co-invented With the Deceased
Patent Count Citation Count Count of Patents Count of Patents
with No Citations in Top 5% of Citations
AfterDeathReal -0.03088 -0.03571 -0.03288 -0.0084
s.e. (0.01525) (0.01815) (0.01525) (0.00478)
AfterDeathAll 0.1162 0.08578 0.05763 0.0247
s.e. (0.05319) (0.12013) (0.08136) (0.02271)
Age and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Fixed Effects No No No No
# Observations 325,726 325,726 325,726 325,726
# Survivors 27,500 27,500 27,500 27,500
# Deceased 9,428 9,428 9,428 9,428
Estimator Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Notes: This table reports the estimated coefficients βReal and βAll from specification (2). The four outcome
variables are as follows: (1) patent count is the number of patents the survivor inventor applied for in a
given year, excluding all patents co-invented with the deceased; (2) citation count is the number of forward
citations received on patents that the survivor applied for in a given year, excluding all patents co-invented
with the deceased; (3) the count of patents with no citations is the number of patents that the survivor
inventor applied for in a given year and that have never been cited as of December 2012, excluding all patents
co-invented with the deceased; (4) the count of patents in the top 5% of citations is the number of patents the
survivor inventor applied for in a given year that were in the top 5% of the citation distribution, excluding
all patents co-invented with the deceased. The sample includes all real and placebo survivor inventors in a
9-year window around the year of co-inventor death, i.e. inventor-year observations are dropped when the
lead or lag relative to co-inventor death is more than 9 years. The unbalanced nature of this panel is the
same for real and placebo inventors. Standard errors are clustered around the deceased inventors.
-etwork are impacted by an unexpected death
In sum, our results show that team-specific capital is important in an in-
ventor’s career because it facilitates co-inventions and - to a lesser extent -
knowledge transmission. We have conducted interviews with patent inven-
tors to confirm that this mechanism is plausible.48 Next, we turn to a closer
48We spoke with fourteen inventors in small start-ups as well as large R&D labs in Silicon
Valley. They pointed out the difficulty of building good collaborative relationships and
emphasized the long-lasting nature of successful collaborations, which often continue to
exist across firm boundaries.
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investigation of the sources of team-specific capital.49
IV. What Are the Sources of Team-Specific Capital?
Team-specific capital refers to the notion that, from the perspective of a
given inventor, their co-inventors are to some extent irreplaceable. The anal-
ysis in Sections III and IV provides direct evidence for the existence and sub-
stantial magnitude of team-specific capital. Given this evidence and guided by
the literature, we now develop hypotheses regarding how team-specific capital
operates and we examine which hypotheses are consistent with the observed
heterogeneity in the treatment effect. Although we cannot interpret the re-
sults presented in this section as causal, the evidence supports models in which
team-specific capital endogenously accumulates over the course of a collabo-
ration.
A. Conceptualization
To help discipline models of technological collaboration, we develop hy-
potheses to answer two questions regarding the nature of team-specific cap-
ital.50 First, where does team-specific capital come from? We distinguish
49Appendix C documents other heterogeneity patterns in the effect of co-inventor death
- by EIN size, survivor’s age, survivor’s co-inventor network size and survivor’s citizenship
status - which are of descriptive interest but are not statistically significant for most out-
comes. Appendix C also shows that co-inventor death does not have a strong impact on
the probability that an inventor starts new collaborations or changes EINs, except if the
inventor was in a small EIN before their co-inventor’s death.
50An emerging theoretical literature examines how social interactions shape long-term
growth. For instance, Lucas and Moll (2014) analyze a model of endogenous growth driven
by knowledge transmission through social interactions. They emphasize “top-down” knowl-
edge transmission in line with empirical studies such as Azoulay, Graff Zivin and Wang
(2010), who show evidence for diffuse knowledge spillovers in intellectual space from “stars.”
Our results on team-specific capital point to another force: very circumscribed spillovers in
collaboration space for the typical inventor. Thus, our evidence points to specific avenues to
pursue in the next generation of growth models with social interactions, taking into account
the role of co-invention activities in addition to top-down knowledge transmission.
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between the “match” and “experience” views of team-specific capital. Second,
how does team-specific capital help increase innovation and earnings? We
discuss the role of moral hazard within teams and social dynamics.
The labor economics and team management literatures offer two competing
hypotheses about the source of team-specific capital. A first view is that
inventors have to incur search costs to find a “good match” among a large
set of potential co-inventors. This idea is similar to the notion of “firms as
inspection goods” in the literature on firm-specific capital (Jovanovic (1979b)).
In this case, team-specific capital is equated with the team’s “match quality”
and is fixed over time: intuitively, high team-specific capital in a team means
that inventors have good collective chemistry. A competing view is that good
teams are not “found” but largely “made”: team-specific capital accumulates
over the course of a collaboration, similar to the notion of “firms as experience
goods” of Jovanovic (1979a).
The managerial implications of this debate are clear: if the “experience”
view best characterizes team dynamics, then the returns to team-building
are high, while improving the matching function between co-inventors may
not be first order. The management literature suggests that team-building
is effective (e.g Pentland (2012); Fapohunda (2013)), and our setting offers a
way of indirectly testing that claim by uncovering properties of team-specific
capital.
The literatures on contract theory and the sociology of teams suggest two
main channels, moral hazard and social dynamics, through which team-specific
capital can increase innovation and earnings. First, teamwork is plagued by
moral hazard because team members can imperfectly monitor their respec-
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tive effort levels.51 The insight of Holmstrom (1982) is that moral hazard in
teams can be solved by the introduction of group incentives.52 If team-specific
capital accumulates during a collaboration, then it provides such group incen-
tives: team members have an extra incentive to exert effort because successful
completion of the project increases team-specific capital and hence future inno-
vation and earnings with that team, akin to a bonus. Moreover, team-specific
capital makes it more likely that inventors will keep working together, since
co-inventors are not easily substituted for, and playing a repeated game re-
duces moral hazard.53 We find empirical support for the moral hazard channel
in Section V.B.
Second, team-specific capital may help solve communication problems and
conflict within the team through social dynamics, in particular for teams with
heterogeneous members. The question of whether within-team heterogeneity
increases or decreases performance has been studied by a vast literature, with
ambiguous predictions.54 Our setting allows us to examine a related ques-
tion: does within-team heterogeneity make a team harder to replace? We
51Free-riding results in suboptimal effort when collectively generating new ideas or when
screening and enriching teammates’ ideas (Wageman (1995); Diehl and Stroebe (1987);
Girotra, Terwiesch and Ulrich (2010))
52By relaxing the balanced budget constraint and offering a bonus to the team in case of
success or a penalty in case of failure, the principal can ensure that team members will all
exert first-best effort levels.
53For a formalization of this intuition in the context of innovation, see Stein (2008).
54See for instance Easterly and Levine (1997); Alesina and Spolaore (1997); La Ferrara
(2007); Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004); Habyarimana et al. (2007); Hjort (2014) .
On the one hand, within-team heterogeneity may be beneficial to a team because combin-
ing different perspectives may increase collective creativity (Jackson and Wolinsky (1996);
Taylor and Greve (2006)) . On the other hand, within-team heterogeneity may reduce
team performance because of preferences (e.g. taste-based discrimination within team, as in
Hjort (2014)), because it is easier to sustain credible threats in homogeneous teams (Hab-
yarimana et al. (2007)) and because communication is easier (Stewart and Stasser (1995);
Gigone and Hastie (1997); Jehn, Northcraft and Neale (1999)). While the existing literature
examines the impact of within-group heterogeneity on the level of performance, we focus on
replacement effects.
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find that the treatment effect is increasing in various measures of within-team
heterogeneity (income, age, geographic dispersion, etc.). We also show direct
evidence that social dynamics are an important component of team-specific
capital by testing predictions from Simmel (1908), who theorizes that specific
team members constitute the basis for trust in the team.
B. Match vs. Experience Components of Team-Specific Capital
In this section, we carry out tests of the “match” and “experience” views
described in Section V.A. We first show that the testable implications of the
“match” view are not borne out in the data and we then provide direct evidence
in support of the “experience” view.55
The main implication of search-and-matching models is that inventors
should suffer less from the loss of their co-inventor, in terms of earnings and
patent production, if it is easier for them to find a new match. It should be
easier for an inventor in a given technology category to find a new co-inventor
if they work in a firm or commuting zone where there is a “thick” market for
inventors in that technology category.56 Lazear (2009) defines market thick-
ness as follows: “a market is thick when the worker receives many offers for a
given amount of search effort. [...] Empirical proxies of search costs and offer
frequencies include regional population density and occupation concentration
55Note that the slow dissipation of rents from previous collaboration, documented in
Section III, makes it difficult to distinguish between these mechanisms based on the dynamics
of the treatment effect alone. Absent slow dissipation, the “match” view would imply
a sharp immediate decline in performance, followed by a rebound as survivors re-match.
Assuming linear returns to experience, the “experience” view would imply an immediate
drop followed by parallel trends. Neither of these patterns is consistent with the data, likely
due to slow rent dissipation. Accordingly, we pursue other tests to distinguish between these
mechanisms.
56We use the 37 “secondary technology categories” defined by the NBER. At this level of
aggregation, co-inventors are typically specializing in the same technology categories. There
is much more heterogeneity at the level of the 400 technology classes defined by the USPTO.
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ratios.” To guide our analysis, we test the two key predictions of the formal
search-and-matching framework of Ja¨ger (2016) : first, a lower probability of
finding a new co-inventor should lead to larger and longer-lasting earnings
and patent effects for survivors; second, finding a new team member should
be correlated with much smaller negative effects for earnings and patents.57
Intuitively, under the match view the newly-hired team member immediately
becomes a perfect replacement for the inventor that used to be part of that
team.
Based on these predictions, we investigate whether inventors suffer less
from the loss of their co-inventor, and whether they are able to find new co-
inventors more quickly, in environments where the market for inventors similar
to them is thick. We build our preferred measure of thickness at the level of
the EIN-by-commuting zone, since we have documented earlier that inventors
do not change CZs or EINs very frequently (even in response to co-inventor
death). For any given inventor, we identify the NBER technology subcategory
(Hall et al. (2001)) in which they have obtained most of their patents as of
the time of co-inventor death. We then compute how many inventors with
similar specialization are in the same EIN-by-commuting zone in the year
prior to death. In robustness checks, we show that the results are similar
when considering measures at the level of commuting zones and using the
density (instead of the number) of inventors with a similar specialization. Ap-
57Ja¨ger (2016) studies frictions from the point of view of the firm, with a focus on wages,
but the model can alternatively be interpreted from the point of view of a team, with a
focus on earnings and patents. His equation (11) implies the formal prediction that the
speed of re-matching and the speed of earnings and patent adjustments should be identical.
Note that if the distribution of quality of potential matches drifts over time, the speed of
re-matching and the speed of earnings and patents adjustment do not have to be exactly
identical, but the qualitative prediction that finding a new team member should be correlated
with smaller negative effects for earnings and patents still holds, and we do not find support
for this prediction in the data.
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Table 8—Match and Experience Components of Team-Specific Capital
Panel A. Heterogeneity by Number of Inventors in Survivor’s NBER Technology Subcategory within
CZ-EIN
Total Earnings Labor Earnings Non-Labor Earnings Patents Citations New Co-inventor
AfterDeathReal
50.237 -76.711 90.821 0.00912 -0.00512 0.228
·InventorNumber (S.D.)
s.e. (45.672) (85.235) (151.362) (0.0304) (0.0102) (0.11608)
Age and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Interacted Fixed Effects EIN-CZ Size Deciles
# Observations 297,017 297,017 297,017 297,017 297,017 297,017
# Survivors 25,089 25,089 25,089 25,089 25,089 25,089
# Deceased 8,554 8,554 8,554 8,554 8,554 8,554
Estimator OLS OLS OLS Poisson Poisson OLS
Panel B. Heterogeneity by Length of Potential Collaboration
Total Earnings Labor Earnings Non-Labor Earnings Patent Count Citation Count
AfterDeathReal
-983.345 -619.342 -254.462 -0.0246 -0.0214
·Potential Collaboration Length
s.e. (363.201) (221.19) (148.023) (0.01118) (0.01081)
Age and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No
Interacted Controls Survivor’s Age at First Patent and Survivor’s Age at Co-Inventor Death
# Observations 325,726 325,726 325,726 325,726 325,726
# Survivors 27,500 27,500 27,500 27,500 27,500
# Deceased 9,428 9,428 9,428 9,428 9,428
Estimator OLS OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
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Table 8—Match and Experience Components of Team-Specific Capital(continued)
Panel C. Are the Returns to Experience Quadratic?
Total Earnings Labor Earnings Non-Labor Earnings Patent Count Citation Count
AfterDeathReal
-901.523 -640.212 -280.462 -0.0216 -0.0223
·Potential Collaboration Length
s.e. (346.538) (266.754) (146.838) (0.00981) (0.01062)
AfterDeathReal
38.534 -50.211 60.231 0.00145 -0.002012
· (Potential Collaboration Length)2
s.e. (45.103) (78.40) (94.928) (0.00982) (0.001524)
Age and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No
Interacted Controls Survivor’s Age at First Patent and Survivor’s Age at Co-Inventor Death
# Observations 325,726 325,726 325,726 325,726 325,726
# Survivors 27,500 27,500 27,500 27,500 27,500
# Deceased 9,428 9,428 9,428 9,428 9,428
Estimator OLS OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
Panel D. Heterogeneity by Length of Potential Collaboration and Survivor Age at First Collaboration
Total Earnings Labor Earnings Non-Labor Earnings Patent Count Citation Count
AfterDeathReal
583.345 380.342 154.462 0.00882 0.00924·Potential Collaboration Length
·Age at F irst Collaboration/10
s.e. (272.424) (190.091) (132.023) (0.004027) (0.004978)
Age and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No
Interacted Controls Survivor’s Age at First Patent, Survivor’s Age at Co-Inventor Death, Potential Collaboration Length
# Observations 325,726 325,726 325,726 325,726 325,726
# Survivors 27,500 27,500 27,500 27,500 27,500
# Deceased 9,428 9,428 9,428 9,428 9,428
Estimator OLS OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
Notes: Panel A documents the heterogeneity in the treatment effect depending on the number of inventors in
the survivor’s technology subcategory, within the inventor’s CZ-EIN in the year preceding co-inventor death
(denoted “inventor number” in the table and standardized by its standard deviation). The specification is
similar to specication (3), except that the interacted controls now include only the number of inventors and
EIN-CZ size deciles. Panels B, C and D document heterogeneity in the treatment effect depending on the
length of potential collaboration between the survivor and the deceased, which is defined as the number of
years between the first joint patent application from the survivor and the deceased and the year of death.
Standard errors are clustered around the deceased inventors.
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-pendix Table D1 shows the distribution of our thickness measures. Panel A of
Table 8 shows that local inventor labor market thickness is not predictive of the
magnitude of the effect of co-inventor death on any of our earnings or patent
outcomes. The point estimates are small and relatively precisely estimated.
In contrast, local inventor labor market thickness is predictive of the speed
at which inventors are able to re-match: survivors are more likely to find
new co-inventors if they work in an environment with more inventors similar
to them. Appendix Tables D2 and D3 show similar results using alternative
proxies for local inventor labor market thickness.58 Appendix Table D4 shows
that our proxy for market thickness becomes predictive of the speed of re-
match only when we build it based on the technology subcategory of the
inventor, which confirms that our results are not driven by broad trends in
the local concentration of inventors. These results are not in line with the
predictions from the “match” view of team-specific capital: when the local
inventor labor market is thicker, new co-inventors are found faster but the
earnings and patent effects are as large as in less thick markets. These results
point to the role of experience effects, as if it took time for a new co-inventor
to become an adequate substitute for the deceased, on which we offer direct
evidence next. The main prediction of the experience view is that the effect
of co-inventor death should be increasing in the length of the collaboration
between the survivor and the deceased. Testing this prediction poses two
challenges. First, the observed length of collaboration in our sample, defined as
the number of years between the first and last patent applications co-invented
by the survivor and the deceased, is endogenous and could stem from a high
58In unreported robustness checks, we obtain similar results when defining the thickness
measure from the point of view of the technology category specialization of the deceased,
which is highly correlated with that of the survivor.
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“fixed match quality”.59 For this reason, to isolate the role of experience we use
the length of “potential collaboration”, defined as the number of years between
the first patent application co-invented by the survivor and the deceased and
co-inventor death.60
The second empirical challenge stems from the collinearity between po-
tential collaboration length and the difference between survivor’s age at co-
inventor death and survivor’s age at first collaboration.61 The formation of
teams is endogenous and, therefore, the age at first collaboration could be
correlated with “fixed match quality” (e.g. if inventors who think alike were
trained in the same schools and are more likely to meet earlier in life).62 Be-
cause of the collinearity between potential collaboration length and age effects,
we cannot control for both age at first collaboration and age at co-inventor
death. However, we can introduce related controls for the survivor’s lifecy-
cle, thus addressing the possible correlation with match quality: we do so in
Appendix Tables D5 and D6 and obtain similar results.63
Panel B of Table 8 shows that potential collaboration length is a strong
predictor of the magnitude of the treatment effect. The magnitude of the
effect approximately doubles with an additional four years of collaboration
for the various earnings and patent outcomes. We interpret these results as
59Indeed, if the (fixed) match quality between two inventors is high, they are likely to
collaborate for a longer duration. We have shown in Table 6 that actual length of collabora-
tion is positively and strongly associated with the magnitude of the treatment effect, but by
itself this evidence does not help distinguish between the “match” and “experience” views.
60Note that with this proxy our results are likely to be biased downward, because the
survivor and deceased may have stopped collaborating by the time of co-inventor death.
61Indeed, note that with two inventors i and j, PotentialCollaborationLengthij ≡
Y earCoinventorDeathij − Y earF irstCollaborationij = AgeAtCoinventorDeathi −
AgeAtF irstCollaborationi.
62Appendix D2 offers a formalization of the notions of “fixed match quality” and “expe-
rience effects”, as well as an in-depth discussion of how the collinearity between potential
collaboration length and age effects is addressed by our set of controls.
63Appendix D.2 provides an in-depth discussion of these issues.
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providing evidence for large “returns to experience” in teamwork. In Panel C
of Table 8, we test whether the returns to experience are linear or quadratic.
We find that the quadratic term is not significant and small in magnitude.
Linear returns to experience explain why the effect of losing a co-inventor is
long-lasting: the real survivors do not catch up with the placebo survivors,
even after re-matching.64
Finally, in Panel D of Table 8, we implement a simple test for the idea that
the experience component of team-specific capital might come from relationship-
specific investments. This view predicts that the horizon of collaboration de-
termines the magnitude of the returns to experience. If the survivor meets
the deceased later in their career, the horizon of collaboration is likely to be
shorter, implying smaller relationship-specific investments and lower returns
to experience. In contrast, if returns to experience mechanically result from
learning by doing, then survivor’s age at the time of first collaboration with
the deceased should not be predictive of the magnitude of the returns. We
find that survivor’s age is in fact a strong predictor, which is consistent with
the role of relationship-specific investments. Taken together, our findings sug-
gests that team-specific capital endogenously accumulates over the course of
a collaboration and reduces moral hazard by making team members more in-
terdependent, as discussed in Section V.A.
C. Team Structure and Social Dynamics
In this section, we present evidence on how the treatment effect varies
depending on team structure and social dynamics. First, we find that all
64Note that if we had found convex returns to experience, it could have explained why
the effect appears gradually over time. We thank a referee for this suggestion. However,
returns appear to be linear (in the range of years that we can observe) and we have shown in
Section III that the gradual nature of the effect can be explained by the fact that innovation
is a stochastic and long-term process.
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measures of within-team heterogeneity from Section II.D give similar results:
the effect is larger in more heterogeneous teams. For succinctness, we report
results using the within-team coefficient of variation as a measure of team het-
erogeneity, standardized by its standard deviation. To obtain a comprehensive
measure of team heterogeneity, we construct an average of the coefficients of
variation for age, cumulative forward citations, and labor earnings. Panel A
of Table 9 reports the results: a one standard deviation increase in our hetero-
geneity measure is associated with an increase in magnitude for the treatment
effect of about 15% for the various outcomes. Controls interacted with treat-
ment status ensure that these results are not driven by top-down spillovers or
lifecycle effects.65
This finding is consistent with the idea that team-specific capital may im-
prove teamwork by increasing trust, which is more likely to be lacking in more
heterogeneous teams. To provide direct evidence on the role of trust, we use
the dynamics of team formation, following Simmel (1908). We consider the
case of triads that were “closed” by one of the team members over the course
of our sample. A triad is a team composed of three inventors. We say that
inventor A “closed” the A-B-C triad if, prior to the first patent application
by this triad, A had filed at least one joint patent application with B and,
separately, A had also filed at least one joint patent application with C, but
B and C had never had any joint patent. Simmel (1908) theorizes that, in
such a case, the inventor that closed the triad constitutes the basis for trust
in the team, because the social ties between the other two inventors are much
looser. We test Simmel (1908)’s hypothesis by identifying triads that were
65The results are similar when considering single coefficients of variation, instead of their
average. In Appendix Table D7, we report a horse race between various within-team het-
erogeneity measures.
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closed over the course of our sample. We build registers of unique dyads and
triads of inventors based on taxpayer identifiers and are thus able to identify
instances when the triad was closed as well as which inventor closed the triad.
We then study heterogeneity in the treatment effect, in the sample of triads
that were closed, depending on whether the deceased closed the triad or not.
Triadic closure is a relatively common event and, therefore, we retain a suffi-
cient sample size to conduct this exercise. We control for relative ability levels
(interacted with the post-death indicator) to ensure that the results are not
driven by asymmetric spillovers. Panel B of 9 shows the results: the magnitude
of the treatment effect is about 15% to 30% larger when the deceased closed
the triad, relative to when they did not. We show the robustness of this result
relative to other samples and sets of interacted controls in Appendix Tables
D8 and D9, ensuring that these results are not driven by top-down spillovers
or lifecycle effects. These results suggest that team-specific capital operates
through social dynamics and increased trust between inventors.
In Appendix D, we report a series of additional tests for two other topics
often discussed in the literature on teams: we find that the effect is larger
when the team is less geographically dispersed (Appendix Table D10) and we
find no significant heterogeneity by team size (Appendix Table D11).
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Table 9—Heterogeneity by Team Structure
Panel A. Heterogeneity by Degree of Within-Team Heterogeneity
Total Earnings Labor Earnings Non-Labor Earnings Patent Count Citation Count
AfterDeathReal · CV
SD(CV )
-522.912 -421.242 -126.120 -0.01892 -0.01710
s.e. (182.320) (156.21) (98.231) (0.00792) (0.00773)
AfterDeathReal -3,532.106 -2,630.121 -1,045.118 -0.1122 -0.1190
s.e. (945.234) (708.136) (458.824) (0.02157) (0.2139)
Age and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No
Interacted Controls Relative ability level, Survivor’s age at co-inventor death
# Observations 325,726 325,726 325,726 325,726 325,726
# Survivors 27,500 27,500 27,500 27,500 27,500
# Deceased 9,428 9,428 9,428 9,428 9,428
Estimator OLS OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
Panel B. Heterogeneity by Triadic Closure
Total Earnings Labor Earnings Non-Labor Earnings Patent Count Citation Count
AfterDeathReal
-813.313 -787.35 -179.85 -0.01843 -0.021431
·DeceasedClosedTriad
s.e. (387.695) (339.375) (105.794) (0.00875) (0.009318)
AfterDeathReal -3,750.231 -2,804.214 -1,150.522 -0.10031 -0.09892
s.e. (1543.21) (1070.214) (660.928) (0.03459) (0.042583)
Age and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No
Interacted Controls Relative ability level, Survivor’s age at co-inventor death
# Observations 15,232 15,232 15,232 15,232 15,232
# Survivors 1,360 1,360 1,360 1,360 1,360
# Deceased 680 680 680 680 680
Estimator OLS OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
Notes: Panel A reports heterogeneity in the treatment effect depending on the degree of within-team
heterogeneity (measured as the average of the within-team coefficients of variation for age, cumulative
for-ward citations and labor earnings, standardized by its standard deviation). Panel B uses the sample
of “closed triads”, defined in the main text in Section V. C., and shows heterogeneity in the treatment




In this paper, we have shown that team-specific capital is an important
ingredient of the typical patent inventor’s lifecycle earnings and innovation,
much like firm-specific capital is crucial for the typical worker (Topel (1991)).
We find that a co-inventor’s premature death causes a large and long-lasting
decline in an inventor’s labor earnings (- 3.8% after 8 years), total earnings (-
4% after 8 years) and citation-weighted patents (- 15% after 8 years). Con-
sistent with the team-specific capital interpretation, the effect is larger for
more closely-knit teams and primarily applies to co-invention activities with
the deceased.
Analysis of heterogeneity in the treatment effect shows that team-specific
capital increases over the course of a collaboration, rather than being fixed over
time as in search-and-matching models. Moreover, the results of our hetero-
geneity analysis are in line with the view that team-specific capital improves
the ability of a team to innovate through reduced moral hazard (consistent
with Holmstrom (1982)) and through increased trust (consistent with Simmel
(1908)). Taken together, these findings help discipline models of technological
collaboration and, from a managerial perspective, suggest that the returns to
team-building are high.
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